European Football Competitveness
Trying out Deep Research
High level takeaways: Pleasantly surprised by the sources being somewhat unique, like small blogs or random ECA reports. But the overall insight is surface level given the lack of specificity on sign posts of improvement/decline, but can definitely see how Deep Research gets you up to speed quickly.
Competitiveness of European Football Leagues Beyond the Big Four
Historical Context & Divergence
In men’s club football, England, Spain, Germany, and Italy (“the Big Four”) have established a clear financial and competitive edge over other European leagues. This divergence accelerated with the commercialization of the sport from the 1990s onward. The English Premier League (EPL) in particular has grown into a financial colossus – its clubs generated about €7.1 billion in revenue in 2023, almost double the revenue of Germany’s Bundesliga (€3.6 billion) or Spain’s La Liga (€3.7 billion)
. In fact, UEFA’s 2023 report shows Premier League clubs’ total revenues nearly doubled those of Germany and Spain, with even a median Premier League club earning 60% more revenue than a Bundesliga counterpart and over three times more than equivalents in Serie A or La Liga
. This massive income gap – largely driven by broadcasting and commercial deals – has allowed Big Four clubs to consistently attract top talent and perform well in UEFA competitions, reinforcing their leagues’ high UEFA coefficients year after year.
Broadcasting Deals and Commercial Growth: A key reason the Big Four pulled away is the explosion in TV rights and global marketing. The Premier League led the way by aggressively selling its product overseas in the 1990s and 2000s. Former EPL chief Richard Scudamore “went really, really hard on the global market,” initially even underpricing overseas TV deals to build viewership
. The strategy paid off: by 2023 the EPL was earning about $3.8 billion annually from broadcasting, nearly double La Liga’s ~$2 billion
. No other football league comes close, and only the NFL surpasses it in sports media rights globally
. Domestic TV deals in England (with Sky, BT, etc.) also soared in value through the 2000s (a £5.5 billion deal for 2022-2025
), outpacing all other countries. Spain’s La Liga and Italy’s Serie A likewise grew rich from TV, but faced issues like inequitable distribution (historically, Real Madrid and Barcelona took a disproportionate share in Spain) and stagnating deals. Germany’s Bundesliga, despite huge fan support, kept a more conservative approach to TV rights (and limits on kickoff times for fans’ sake), leading to lower TV income than the EPL. Over time, the Premier League’s broadcast revenue has simply dwarfed others, with its clubs in 2021/22 earning roughly double the TV income of La Liga clubs
. This broadcast boom, coupled with savvy global branding, made English clubs less dependent on UEFA prize money and more resilient financially than continental peers
.
League Governance and Investment: Governance models also shaped this divergence. The Premier League broke away as a club-controlled entity in 1992, prioritizing commercial growth and competitive entertainment value. It implemented collective TV rights sales and revenue sharing that, while still favoring top clubs, gave even lower-table English clubs a hefty income – often more than champions of smaller leagues. By contrast, many other leagues had governance or stability issues: Italy’s Serie A suffered from corruption scandals (e.g. Calciopoli), outdated stadiums and debt-laden clubs in the 2000s, weakening its financial might. Spain only moved to collective TV rights in 2015; before that, duopoly power and debt plagued its clubs. Germany’s 50+1 ownership rule ensured fan control and fiscal prudence but likely deterred some foreign mega-investment. Meanwhile, the Big Four leagues were generally more open to wealthy investors and corporate owners: for example, oligarchs, billionaires, and even sovereign wealth funds (as with Manchester City, PSG) pumped money into top clubs. This inflow of capital further widened the gap in squad quality and infrastructure. The resulting virtuous cycle saw Big Four clubs dominate UEFA competitions and earn more prize money, which UEFA’s reports show has grown 367% since 2009
. Those rewards, plus huge sponsorship deals (another area where Premier League and La Liga giants excel), kept the Big Four entrenched atop the UEFA coefficient rankings.
Premier League’s Unmatched Growth: The Premier League exemplifies how financial power translates to global competitiveness. Its revenue growth has outpaced all rivals: even coming out of the pandemic, Premier League club revenues rose 12% to £5.5 billion in 2021/22
. By 2023, the average Premier League club earned €348 million, far above the average in Germany (€213m) or Spain (€177m)
. Such resources let even mid-table English clubs outbid elite continental clubs for players. For instance, in 2023 newly-promoted Bournemouth could spend £40m to poach a star striker (Evanilson) from Porto – a club with two European titles
. In the 2023 summer window, Premier League clubs combined spent almost £2 billion on transfers, exceeding the entire spend of all clubs in Bundesliga, La Liga, and Serie A combined
. This financial clout means Premier League sides can remain competitive even without Champions League income
, whereas clubs in smaller leagues often must sell talent or rely on UCL money to balance books. Ultimately, the Big Four’s head start in monetizing broadcasting, coupled with strong domestic markets and (in England’s case) advantageous global appeal (e.g. language, international fanbases), created a financial gulf that underpins their dominance in UEFA rankings and on the pitch.
Leagues on the Cusp of Competitiveness
Outside the Big Four, a few European leagues are striving to bridge the gap and occasionally produce teams capable of deep UEFA runs. Foremost among these is France’s Ligue 1, often considered the “fifth” of Europe’s top leagues. In recent years, however, Ligue 1’s overall European competitiveness has stagnated despite Paris Saint-Germain’s superstar-fueled dominance domestically. PSG’s Qatari-funded project has given France a perennial Champions League contender, but it may have come at a cost to league depth. PSG’s budget (reported around €500m) dwarfs most Ligue 1 clubs (some operate under €30m)
, making the title race predictable. This financial imbalance and one-club dominance can weaken the league’s other teams in Europe – they struggle to keep talent or invest at the needed level. Tellingly, apart from PSG’s occasional deep runs (final in 2020, semi in 2021), French clubs have made fewer Champions League quarter-finals in the past decade than those from England, Spain, Germany, or Italy. Even in the Europa League or Conference League, French sides have underperformed their status. For example, 2022/23 saw a “near complete wipeout” of French teams in Europe by March
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. Ligue 1’s reputation as a “farmers’ league” – a talent supplier to richer competitions – has some truth: clubs like Lyon, Monaco, Lille and Marseille regularly develop or scout top players (think of Mbappé, Benzema, Mané at some point) only to sell them to wealthier leagues. This drain, combined with misfortunes like the 2020 collapse of Ligue 1’s TV deal, has hurt competitiveness. (The €3.25 billion Mediapro broadcast contract imploded within months, leaving Ligue 1 clubs suddenly missing hundreds of millions in expected revenue
. French clubs lost an estimated £1.5 billion from that collapse and the COVID shutdown, forcing many to sell talent and cut costs
.) The result is that outside PSG, French clubs often lack the squad depth to sustain European campaigns while fighting domestically. Even PSG’s European record has faltered – they’ve been knocked out in the Champions League Round of 16 five of the last seven seasons
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, raising questions about whether dominating a less intense league prepares them poorly for continental giants. In summary, France has the market size and club pedigree (historically, Olympique de Marseille won the Champions League in 1993, Monaco and Lyon have reached semis) to be on the cusp, but governance missteps and financial disruptions have stalled its collective progress.
Beyond France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium stand out as mid-sized leagues that consistently “punch above their weight” in UEFA competitions. These leagues cannot match the Big Four’s financial firepower – their entire club revenues are often smaller than one or two top Premier League clubs – yet they leverage other strengths to compete. Portugal’s Primeira Liga is a prime example: the Portuguese Big Three (Benfica, Porto, Sporting CP) have a rich European history (Porto lifted the Champions League in 2004 and Europa League in 2003 and 2011) and continue to churn out competitive squads through player development and smart trading. Portuguese clubs excel at scouting and nurturing talent – often from Brazil, Africa, and their own academies – and then selling at big profits. According to a recent analysis, Benfica, Porto, and Sporting were three of only seven top European clubs to post a net positive transfer balance from 2020-2023
. All three earned well over €100 m from outgoing transfers in recent seasons (e.g. Sporting sold stars like Nuno Mendes, Bruno Fernandes, João Palhinha for huge sums)
. They reinvest shrewdly, which helps them stay competitive on the field. While they can’t retain all their talent, this transfer market efficiency means Portuguese clubs are rarely financially crippled and can assemble new competitive teams regularly. It’s no coincidence that Porto and Benfica frequently reach the Champions League knockout rounds despite fraction of the budget of their English or Spanish counterparts. Porto in particular has mastered this model, repeatedly upsetting wealthier clubs with well-drilled teams full of future stars. Youth academies and scouting are critical – from Cristiano Ronaldo and Luís Figo (Sporting CP products) to João Félix (Benfica) to Deco and Pepe (Porto polished these players), Portugal’s pipeline keeps yielding talent that fuels both sporting success and financial gain.
The Netherlands’ Eredivisie follows a similar pattern. Dutch clubs, especially Ajax, PSV Eindhoven, and Feyenoord, prioritize youth development and tactical schooling, reflecting the country’s famed football philosophy. Ajax’s academy (De Toekomst) is world-renowned for producing elite players (Johan Cruyff in the past, more recently Matthijs de Ligt, Frenkie de Jong, etc.), and Ajax’s 2019 Champions League campaign was a testament to that system. With a squad of homegrown youngsters and affordable signings, Ajax knocked out Real Madrid and Juventus en route to a semi-final, coming seconds from the final. That run boosted the Netherlands’ UEFA coefficient significantly, helping the Eredivisie rise to 6th in Europe
. However, as with Portugal, the challenge is depth – Ajax aside, other Dutch clubs have had sporadic impact (PSV and Feyenoord have won European Cups, but decades ago). Still, clubs like AZ Alkmaar or PSV can often make Europa League quarter-finals, and the Netherlands continues to innovate with coaching and talent (they also benefit from a planned merger of youth leagues with Belgium, and allowed more foreign investors recently). Notably, Ajax and PSV also excel at player trading; Ajax was among the top few clubs in Europe in net transfer profits recently
. Their constraint is financial: TV revenues in the Eredivisie are low (the domestic market is small), so Dutch clubs rely on European prize money and transfers to compete. A mooted BeNeLiga (merging the Belgian and Dutch top flights) has been studied as a way to increase broadcasting income – Deloitte estimated such a merged league could generate up to €400 million per year in TV and marketing rights
, far more than the leagues earn separately.
Belgium’s Pro League likewise produces competitive teams relative to its size. Traditionally dominated by a few clubs (Anderlecht, Club Brugge, Standard Liège), Belgium has improved its youth development dramatically (the country’s “Golden Generation” in national team came from club academies). Belgian clubs now regularly nurture players who move to top leagues (e.g. De Bruyne and Courtois came through Genk). On the field, clubs like Brugge have punched above weight – Club Brugge reached the Champions League Round of 16 in 2022, and Belgian sides often make deep runs in the Europa League or the new Conference League. Their secret has been academy investments and data-driven scouting. With limited budgets, Belgian teams recruit from lesser-known markets and give young players first-team chances, then sell to richer leagues. This sustainable approach keeps them in UEFA contention; for instance, KRC Genk and Anderlecht have consistently high UEFA youth rankings and occasionally spring upsets in senior competition. Belgium’s league format (with championship playoffs) also tries to keep the title race competitive, preparing clubs for high-stakes European matches. The limitation, however, is again money – the entire Belgian league’s revenue is barely on par with a single mid-tier Premier League club. Thus, while Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium produce competitive teams despite financial limitations, they remain feeder leagues in the global market, and their UEFA success often comes in cycles when a particular club has a golden generation. Intelligent player development and trading are crucial for these leagues to stay relevant internationally
, and on that front they arguably outperform many richer leagues (for example, the Portuguese trio and Ajax show that strategic club management can mitigate some financial disadvantage).
Challenges & Roadblocks for Other Leagues
Several other European leagues with past glory have struggled to sustain competitiveness in the modern era. Notably, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and Greece – all countries whose clubs have tasted European success in decades past – have seen their UEFA rankings drop due to a mix of financial, political, and structural problems.
Russia & Ukraine: In the mid-2000s, Russia’s Premier League appeared ascendant: CSKA Moscow and Zenit St. Petersburg each won the UEFA Cup (2005 and 2008), and Russian clubs were attracting big-name players with lucrative offers. But the momentum fizzled out. Even before Russia’s current political isolation, its football progress had stalled. After peaking as the 6th-ranked league in Europe around 2008-2010, Russia’s league slipped to 10th and then 18th by 2022
. The initial boom was fueled by oligarch wealth (Gazprom backing Zenit, e.g., and oligarchs investing in clubs), but there was weak infrastructure and governance under the surface. Many clubs were not run sustainably – few modern academies were built, and little was done to market Russian clubs globally or improve attendance. When Western sanctions hit Russia in 2014 (after Crimea), the ruble’s sharp devaluation meant those extravagant player salaries became unsustainable
. Owners like Roman Abramovich pulled back funding for football projects in Russia
, and plans to modernize facilities (like building indoor stadiums for winter) were shelved. Moreover, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules introduced in 2011 curtailed the ability of Russia’s ambitious clubs to spend beyond their internally generated revenues
. FFP’s intention was to force clubs to live within their means, but an unintended effect was locking in the advantage of already-rich Western European clubs, making it harder for an upstart from, say, Russia or Ukraine to splurge its way to the top
. By the late 2010s, Russian clubs were largely absent from the latter stages of European tournaments, and the national team’s World Cup quarter-final run in 2018 masked a decline in club competitiveness. The war in Ukraine since 2022 then delivered a final blow: Russian clubs are now banned from all UEFA competitions “until further notice”
. The isolation has caused domestic attendances to plummet (down 32% from their post-World Cup high)
, reduced sponsorship, and led some foreign players to leave. In short, Russia’s league has the population and past success to be a contender, but corruption, poor planning, and now political circumstances have turned it into a pariah on the European stage
. Ukraine’s story is intertwined – Ukrainian clubs like Dynamo Kyiv and Shakhtar Donetsk were Europa League/Champions League regulars (Shakhtar won the UEFA Cup in 2009). However, Ukraine’s economy and league were severely hit by conflict starting in 2014. Shakhtar, based in Donetsk, has been exiled from its home city for years due to war, playing “home” games in Kyiv or even abroad and losing the local fanbase and revenue that came with their brand-new Donbass Arena
. The ongoing war (2022-) forced an exodus of foreign talent from Ukraine and even caused the 2022 league season to be abandoned. With clubs struggling to pay players and some infrastructure destroyed, Ukrainian teams have understandably fallen behind. Even though Shakhtar and Dynamo maintain respectable squads and youth programs, the geopolitical instability and economic hardships have made it nearly impossible for them to compete deep into Europe as they did a decade ago. UEFA has given Ukraine’s champion direct Champions League entry in solidarity, but the playing field is far from level when your club exists in wartime conditions.
Turkish football boasts enormous fan passion and big-city derbies, yet off-field issues have undercut consistent UEFA success. Here Galatasaray supporters gather in Istanbul – a reminder that fervent support doesn’t always translate into stability and results on the European stage.
Turkey: The Turkish Süper Lig has long been known for passionate support and some historically strong clubs (Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş). Galatasaray even won the UEFA Cup in 2000, and Turkish sides were group-stage staples in the Champions League for decades. Recently, however, Turkey’s UEFA coefficient has slipped (dropping out of the top 10, and in 2023 no Turkish club made the Champions League group stage)
. The issues are largely financial and governance-related. Turkish clubs expanded rapidly in the 2000s – building expensive new stadiums and signing foreign stars – but often on the back of heavy debt. Local TV revenues and sponsorships never grew to Premier League levels, and Turkey’s volatile economy (high inflation and a crashing lira) eroded clubs’ spending power. By the late 2010s, many top clubs were in financial crisis; UEFA punished some for breaching FFP (Galatasaray, for example, was banned from Europe for two years in 2016 over FFP violations)
. The domestic league also suffered from political interference and poor federation planning – frequent changes to foreign player limits, leadership tussles, and even a 2011 match-fixing scandal that saw Fenerbahçe briefly excluded from the Champions League. All this instability made it hard to implement long-term strategies. Consequently, Turkish teams have struggled to retain talent (players often leave due to unpaid wages or better offers abroad) and to modernize their operations. As an illustration of the decline: from 1997 to 2017, a Turkish club appeared in the Champions League group stage every season
; now it is no longer a given, with champions needing to go through tough qualifiers – in 2023 both Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe were eliminated in qualifying rounds, meaning no Turkish team in the UCL proper
. This absence not only hurts prestige but also denies clubs the prize and TV money they desperately need. The passion of Turkish fans remains world-class – derby days in Istanbul are still spectacles – and a new generation of players is coming through (Turkey’s U16s and U17s have had some success). But until clubs get their finances in order (the Turkish federation even instituted its own “Financial Fair Play” debt restructuring program recently
) and adopt sustainable models, consistent UEFA competitiveness will be out of reach. Political and economic volatility – factors largely outside the clubs’ control – remain major wildcards for Turkish football’s future.
Greece: Greek football enjoyed a golden period in the early 2000s, capped by the national team’s shocking Euro 2004 victory and regular Champions League last-16 appearances for Olympiacos or Panathinaikos. Two decades later, the Greek Super League has fallen far off that pace. By 2020/21 Greece’s league coefficient hit an all-time low of 20th in Europe
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, meaning Greece lost its direct Champions League group spot and its clubs rarely make it past qualifying rounds. The decline is rooted in financial crises and mismanagement. The Greek economic crisis of 2009-2015 hit clubs brutally – sponsorship dried up, owners lost money, and clubs like AEK Athens went bankrupt (AEK was relegated to the third division in 2013 to clear debts)
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. Panathinaikos, once a European Cup finalist (1971) and regular quarter-finalist, also saw its wealthy owner withdraw, leaving the club a “shadow” of its former self
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. With only Olympiacos remaining financially strong through the 2010s, domestic competition eroded – Olympiacos won 7 straight titles at one point – which paradoxically hurt Olympiacos in Europe, as cruising through a weak league left them ill-prepared for high-level continental play
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. Beyond finances, Greek football has been marred by corruption and violence, scaring away investment. There have been numerous officiating scandals and allegations of top clubs influencing referees. As Greek football expert Greg Gavalas noted, “corruption has hurt the Greek game greatly” – what used to be three strong teams (OLY, PAO, AEK) was reduced to one dominant club
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. Fan violence and poor infrastructure also play a role: empty or unsafe stadiums make it hard to grow revenue or attract families to games. UEFA has intervened multiple times to warn Greek clubs and federation to reform governance. While Olympiacos, PAOK, AEK, and Panathinaikos still occasionally make Europa League or Conference League runs, the league as a whole lacks the resources now to consistently compete. Encouragingly, some signs of revival exist – new investors (often foreign) have bought into clubs like PAOK and Panathinaikos, and Greece’s coefficient has rebounded to around 15th as of 2024
. But the roadblocks of the past – unstable finances, weak league organization, and talent exodus (most top Greek players move abroad early) – must be overcome for a true resurgence.
In summary, leagues like Russia’s, Ukraine’s, Turkey’s, and Greece’s face a common problem: they achieved sporadic success when a combination of local economic strength and talent generation aligned, but could not institutionalize that success amid broader structural weaknesses. Political instability (war, economic crises), inadequate league governance (corruption, poor marketing, debt), and UEFA’s stricter financial regulations have all held these leagues back from keeping pace with Europe’s elite. Sustained competitiveness requires stability off the pitch – something these leagues have struggled to maintain.
Roadmaps for Closing the Gap
Is it possible for leagues outside the Big Four to meaningfully close the gap? While the financial disparities are huge, strategic reforms and smart investment could improve competitiveness over time. Here are several pathways and ideas often discussed for leagues like France, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium and others to challenge the elite:
Structural Reforms & League Collaboration: Smaller leagues are exploring structural changes to become more competitive and financially viable. One bold idea is cross-border league mergers, like the proposed BeNeLiga combining Dutch and Belgian top clubs. Studies suggest a merged league could dramatically increase TV revenues (up to €400 m per year, vs under €200 m combined currently)
, by creating a more attractive product with bigger matchups and a larger media market. Such a league would also concentrate talent that is currently split, potentially yielding a few clubs that can spend and compete at a higher level (much as the EPL’s formation did for English clubs). While merging leagues faces many hurdles (UEFA approval, domestic resistance, logistical issues), the fact that Belgian clubs voted in favor of pursuing talks shows the appetite for creative solutions. Even without full mergers, smaller leagues can collaborate on marketing and scheduling – for example, avoiding clashing TV slots with the Champions League, or pooling international broadcast rights for better deals. Domestic format tweaks can also help competitiveness: the Belgian league’s playoff system, or the recent expansion of Austria’s league followed by a championship round, are aimed at keeping more clubs in contention and improving match intensity. A competitive domestic league, in theory, hardens clubs for Europe. Additionally, ensuring fair revenue sharing within leagues is vital – top-heavy distributions (as in Spain historically, or in countries where one giant gets most sponsorship) need reform so that multiple clubs can strengthen together.
Financial Strategy and Investment: Money is the toughest gap to bridge, but there are strategies to maximize resources. One is attracting strategic investors – many mid-tier European clubs have become targets for American, Middle Eastern, or other foreign owners looking for the “next big thing.” While a billionaire owner alone can’t simply outspend UEFA’s elite due to FFP, smart investment can build infrastructure (academies, stadiums) and analytics departments that give a club an edge in player development. We’ve seen examples: Red Bull’s investment in clubs like RB Salzburg (Austria) and Leipzig (Germany) created highly competitive teams via advanced scouting and youth recruiting networks. A smaller league could encourage such investment by easing foreign ownership rules or offering incentives – for instance, France in recent years has seen a wave of foreign owners in traditional clubs (American owners at Marseille, Bordeaux, Lyon; a Russian at Monaco; Qatar at PSG), which has injected funds and professionalism. However, reliance on benefactors can be risky if not paired with good governance; hence, league-level financial oversight is needed to ensure stability (like licensing systems that require clubs to meet certain fiscal criteria, something Germany’s DFL has long done). Another idea gaining traction is better continental revenue distribution – mid-tier leagues benefit if UEFA competitions share more income beyond the top clubs. The new UEFA Europa Conference League, for example, gives smaller-nation clubs a realistic shot at a trophy and additional prize money, which can be reinvested. Pushing UEFA to adjust the coefficient and prize system to be less skewed (the current format heavily rewards repeat participants) could help – though top clubs resist anything that lessens their share. There is talk of coefficient adjustments or even salary caps: UEFA’s new “squad cost ratio” rules will limit club spending on wages/transfers to 70% of revenue in coming years, which may slightly curb the richest teams’ excesses and prevent reckless overspending by smaller ones.
Domestic Talent Retention: A crucial factor is keeping talent longer. Leagues can implement policies to incentivize home-grown players to stay and develop domestically rather than being sold at the first offer. Some approaches include improved contract structures (e.g. sell-on fees that encourage clubs to hold players until a big bid arrives, rather than selling low), or even league-wide agreements to not sell in winter windows which can derail a club’s European campaign. UEFA’s solidarity payments and training compensation for clubs who develop players (when those players move abroad) offer some financial consolation, but often not enough. Perhaps lobbying for higher solidarity percentages in transfers (so that if, say, Benfica sells a player to a Premier League side for €100m, a bigger slice goes back into Portuguese grassroots) could be part of the strategy
. Ultimately, though, ambition and salaries drive players – to retain top talent, leagues like the Dutch or Belgian would need to increase salaries to competitive levels, which circles back to increasing revenue. Some have suggested collective salary caps at a league level to reduce the gap between teams (like how MLS operates), but in an open European system, caps might just drive top players to other leagues. Instead, focusing on being a springboard league – but one that can keep a core together long enough to make a mark in Europe (as Ajax did in 2019) – might be more realistic.
Governance and Sustainability: Closing the gap also requires cleaning up internal issues. Corruption, ultras violence, inconsistent refereeing – these issues plague several mid-tier leagues (as noted with Greece, Turkey) and make sponsors and fans hesitant, thereby limiting growth. A roadmap to competitiveness involves professionalizing league management – hiring competent executives, enforcing transparent rules, and partnering with governments on things like tax incentives for clubs or infrastructure projects. For example, Italy has been trying to address its stadium problem (many Serie A clubs still play in old municipal stadiums). New or modernized stadiums can greatly boost revenue (through higher attendance and commercial opportunities) – Juventus’s new stadium in 2011 was Italy’s first club-owned modern ground and helped Juve increase matchday income, contributing to their 2010s European resurgence. If France allowed more favorable tax treatment for football investment, its clubs might retain players easier (French taxes on high earners are steep, which has at times driven players to move abroad). Every league has its specific issues to fix: for Portugal and Netherlands, it might be negotiating better TV deals and expanding overseas fan engagement; for Brazil (just outside Europe, but a relevant comparison), it was restructuring clubs as corporations to attract investors; for smaller Eastern leagues, it could be merging or regional competitions to achieve scale.
External Factors – Super League and Reforms: An oft-discussed external factor is the specter of a European Super League (ESL). If a breakaway ESL had happened (with top clubs forming their own closed competition), it could have a mixed impact on the “challenger” leagues. On one hand, the domestic leagues left behind might lose their biggest clubs (e.g. if Ajax or Benfica joined an ESL, their domestic leagues would suffer greatly in quality and interest). On the other hand, if the Big Four’s giants left the UEFA Champions League structure, the remaining UEFA competitions might become more accessible for clubs from France, Portugal, etc. – essentially resetting the competitive landscape. However, given the backlash, any ESL seems unlikely in the near future, and UEFA is instead expanding the Champions League in a way that still favors the top leagues (additional spots based on coefficient, which will usually go to nations like England or Spain). Mid-tier leagues would prefer a more egalitarian system – e.g. guaranteed group stage slots for champions of, say, the top 10-12 leagues, which the new format does increase slightly. Some have floated coefficient weighting (giving more points for wins by clubs from smaller nations) to help them climb the rankings, but that hasn’t materialized. In general, changes like an ESL or drastic coefficient tweaks could either help or hurt these leagues, depending on implementation, so their best approach is to strengthen themselves irrespective of uncertain external reforms. Leagues banding together through organizations like the European Leagues Association can also lobby UEFA for a more balanced revenue distribution, arguing that competitive balance across Europe makes the sport healthier long-term.
In essence, the road to closing the gap involves growing revenue, investing wisely, and cooperating. Leagues like France, Portugal, Netherlands, and Belgium must continue focusing on what they do well (youth development, scouting) while adopting modern business practices from the Big Four (global marketing tours, better commercial deals, fan engagement technology) to enlarge their financial pie. Strategic foreign investment can help kick-start growth, but it must be guided by sound governance. It’s a delicate balance – chase competitiveness without losing identity or stability. If done right, we could see more Ajax- or Porto-like stories, where clubs from outside the elite consistently challenge Europe’s best.
Comparative Case Studies
Looking beyond Europe’s mid-tier, it’s insightful to compare with league models outside Europe and with unique club success stories that defy financial odds. These comparisons can offer lessons (and warnings) for aspiring leagues.
Major League Soccer (USA/Canada): MLS operates on a radically different model – it’s a closed league with no promotion/relegation, strict salary caps, and revenue sharing, similar to North American sports leagues. Competitive balance is high domestically (no one or two clubs dominate every year), but the overall level has historically been below top European leagues. Interestingly, MLS clubs have recently begun to compete better internationally, winning the CONCACAF Champions League and even attracting global stars (e.g. the landmark signing of Lionel Messi in 2023). For Europe’s mid-tier leagues, the MLS model shows the benefit of parity rules – the controlled spending means even “small market” teams can win. A few European leagues have modest versions of this (like the Austrian Bundesliga’s squad cost cap relative to turnover, or second divisions in some countries having salary limits), but implementing an MLS-style cap in an open European context is difficult. However, the emphasis MLS places on infrastructure (soccer-specific stadiums) and youth development (mandating academies, selling youngsters abroad) has paid off. Many MLS teams now profit from transfers (Alphonso Davies from Vancouver to Bayern, Miguel Almirón from Atlanta to Newcastle, etc.), similar to a Belgian or Dutch club strategy. The lesson here is that fiscally responsible growth and reinvestment can, over time, raise a league’s standard. On the flip side, MLS shows that without the threat of relegation or the lure of open international competition, a league might lack the intense competitive edge seen in Europe – something European fans value. So a full MLS model likely wouldn’t be embraced in Europe, but elements like financial discipline and collective marketing could help smaller leagues.
Brazil’s Série A and Others: South America’s leagues, especially Brazil and Argentina, have historically been talent goldmines but financially behind Europe. Brazil, however, is undergoing changes – top clubs are turning into corporate entities with outside investors, and media rights deals are being centralized. Brazilian clubs now often keep players longer (a decade ago, any Brazilian starlet left for Europe at 18; now some stay into their early 20s or even return from Europe in their prime due to improved finances at clubs like Flamengo or Palmeiras). As a result, Brazilian clubs have dominated recent Copa Libertadores (continental championship). The Brazilian example suggests that a huge domestic fanbase and player pool can translate into competitiveness if harnessed with better financial management. European mid-tier leagues don’t have Brazil’s 210 million population, but some (Turkey, Russia) have large markets that, if their economies allow, could sustain stronger leagues. It also highlights the importance of club governance – many Brazilian clubs were formerly run by elected presidents with short-term outlooks, similar to some European clubs that suffer from constant boardroom turnover. Professionalizing the management (often under new investors or club-company conversions) has started to make Brazilian clubs richer and more competitive internationally. A cautionary tale from elsewhere would be China’s Super League – after a burst of heavy spending on foreign players in the mid-2010s, the Chinese league instituted salary caps and saw many clubs collapse financially; it shows that spending big without building sustainable revenue (like global TV deals or local fan interest) is a dead-end. European leagues should focus on organic growth – e.g., build fan engagement through better match experiences and digital content – rather than quick fixes.
Saudi Pro League (SPL): In 2023, Saudi Arabia’s SPL made headlines by signing numerous elite players from Europe for astronomical wages, aiming to rapidly become a top league. This state-driven project demonstrates how sheer financial might can change a league’s profile overnight – suddenly clubs like Al Hilal or Al Nassr have global stars that mid-tier European clubs could never afford. While the Saudi experiment is unique (backed by the Public Investment Fund, essentially unlimited state oil money), it poses a new kind of challenge: mid-level European clubs not only compete with the Big Four for players, but now also with non-European leagues that offer huge salaries tax-free. For instance, a Portuguese or Dutch club trying to sign or keep a veteran star might lose out if a Saudi club offers triple the salary. The long-term sustainability of the SPL is debatable (its 2022 total revenue was reportedly only ~$120m
, so they operate at a massive loss for now), but it underscores that the global competition for talent is widening. European leagues outside the Big Four might find an unlikely advantage here: while top stars may go to Saudi or Qatar for money, younger players seeking development still see Europe’s mid-tier leagues as ideal stepping stones (for coaching, visibility, and UEFA competition exposure). Leagues like the Eredivisie or Belgian Pro League can market themselves as the best pathway to an eventual Big Four move – in fact, this is already their model. They should double down on being talent incubators, which will ensure a continuous pipeline of quality (even if the players eventually leave).
Club Case Studies – Overperformers: Individual club success stories can offer a template for others. Ajax Amsterdam is one: a relatively small-market club that, through philosophy and youth training, regularly competes above its means. Ajax’s run to the 2019 Champions League semi showed that a team of mostly academy players and a few astute signings can beat billionaire squads. The club’s emphasis on a distinct playing style, world-class academy coaching, and courage to play young players allowed them to build a cohesive team that peaked together. The fact that Ajax had to sell many of those stars the next year illustrates the economic reality, but clever reinvestment (they bought new talents like Antony and Lisandro Martínez, later selling them for large profits as well) keeps them in the conversation most years. FC Porto and SL Benfica in Portugal have a similar knack: they scout undervalued talent (often in South America or Africa), polish them (and crucially, instill a winning mentality – Porto in particular has a strong club culture of aiming for European success), and tactically they are often very disciplined. These clubs don’t fear the giants – Porto under Mourinho in 2004, or under Conceição in knocking out Juventus in 2021, show a bold approach. The lesson is that efficient club management and talent development can level the playing field in one-off seasons. However, to translate that into league-wide success, those principles need to be adopted by multiple clubs, not just one hero team. We are seeing encouraging signs: in Austria, the Red Bull Salzburg model (youth, high pressing, recruiting globally) has rubbed off on others, with LASK and Sturm Graz improving their setups. In Croatia, Dinamo Zagreb’s consistent youth production (Modrić, Ćorluka, etc.) has helped them compete in Europe and lift the league’s coefficient. If each mid-tier league can have 2-3 well-run clubs pushing each other, their overall standard rises.
Alternative Financial Models – 50+1 vs Private Ownership: One ongoing debate is what ownership model best serves competitiveness. Germany’s 50+1 rule (members/fans own majority of each club) ensures community control and generally prevents reckless takeovers. It arguably keeps ticket prices lower and clubs solvent (few German clubs have huge debts). However, critics say it limits outside investment – for instance, RB Leipzig had to find a workaround and other clubs can’t get an Abramovich or a Qatar takeover due to the rule. Despite that, German clubs (Bayern, Dortmund) remain quite competitive; Bayern’s consistent deep Champions League runs show 50+1 hasn’t stopped an elite program, though one could argue Bayern’s global commercial pull is an outlier. In England, full private ownership has brought riches to some clubs but also instability to others (e.g. poorly run takeovers leading to relegation or financial crises at certain clubs). For emerging leagues, a hybrid might work: allow foreign/private investment but with regulatory safeguards (like fit-and-proper tests, spending caps relative to revenue – essentially what UEFA’s FFP enforces across Europe). The ideal model might be one that encourages fresh capital but maintains competitive balance. For example, the Swedish and Norwegian leagues have a 51% member ownership rule similar to 50+1, which has kept those clubs stable but also limited their growth internationally (they rarely make a splash in UEFA competitions now). Perhaps a middle ground is what France has moved toward: mostly private ownership with some state aid (like local authorities helping with stadiums) and the federation keeping some control via financial audits by the DNCG (France’s financial watchdog for clubs). Any league trying to rise must avoid boom-and-bust spending – so an emphasis on sustainability is key. The Bundesliga’s model sacrifices some short-term spender advantage for long-term health, which is why German clubs weathered the pandemic better than many others. Each league must find the right balance for its context; but without doubt, reckless spending (as seen in some Russian, Chinese, or even English Championship clubs) is not a viable path to lasting competitiveness.
Vulnerability Analysis
Which leagues outside the Big Four can realistically challenge their dominance in the near future, and conversely, are any of the top four themselves at risk of decline? The landscape is dynamic, but certain trends and signposts are worth monitoring:
Emerging Challengers: As of mid-2020s, the most realistic candidate to join the top tier is France’s Ligue 1 – it’s already considered the “fifth” league and has one of the world’s richest clubs (PSG). If French football can stabilize its finances (e.g. secure a strong new TV deal, which they are attempting post-Mediapro) and if other clubs step up, France could narrow the gap. Signs of progress would include multiple French clubs reaching Champions League knockout stages consistently (not just PSG) and improved UEFA coefficient to challenge Germany or Italy. Another signpost is French teams succeeding in the Europa or Conference League (as Villarreal and Frankfurt did for Spain and Germany recently). The Netherlands has also trended upward – the Eredivisie’s coefficient rose to 6th, overtaking Portugal
. If Dutch clubs continue to perform (say, an Ajax or PSV makes a deep Champions League run while AZ and Feyenoord do well in Europa), the league could solidify a top-5 or 6 spot. Portugal, currently 7th
, has the club pedigree to climb back up – remember, Portugal was ranked as high as 4th in 2011 after Porto and Braga met in a Europa League final. The sale of talented players for huge sums gives Portuguese clubs capital; if they reinvest enough to occasionally keep a squad together (as Benfica did last season reaching the Champions League quarter-final), their coefficient benefits. A tangible goal for these leagues is to earn a second automatic UCL spot (France has had 3 or more for years, Netherlands just earned a second spot for 2024). Belgium too, currently 8th
, could push into the top 6-7 if its clubs maintain recent form – e.g. in 2022/23, clubs like Club Brugge, Gent, and Anderlecht all collected coefficient points with decent runs. One wildcard is a potential merged league (like BeNeLiga); if that happened and was successful, it could create a new powerhouse league ranking-wise. Outside these, leagues like Austria or Scotland had spikes (Austria reached 10th after Salzburg’s consistency; Scotland was 11th recently thanks to Rangers and Celtic making a Europa final and group stage respectively), but depth is an issue – one team’s success can’t carry a whole league indefinitely. To challenge the top four, a league needs at least 2-3 clubs performing internationally year after year.
Vulnerabilities of the Big Four: While the top four leagues are firmly ahead, there are scenarios where one could slip. Italy’s Serie A has been both up and down historically. It was the top league in the 1990s, fell to 4th (even briefly 5th) by the mid-2010s, and has resurged to 2nd in coefficients by 2023
, thanks to a great 2022/23 season (Italian clubs reached the final in all three UEFA competitions). Yet, Serie A’s fundamentals have some cracks: aging infrastructure, lower revenues (about €2.5–3 billion collectively, less than half EPL’s), and ongoing financial turmoil at certain clubs (Inter and Milan have had ownership changes and debt issues, Juventus faced a recent sporting scandal and losses). If Italian clubs falter in Europe for a couple of seasons, Italy could easily drop behind Germany or fall back towards France. The signposts for decline would be losing that 4th Champions League spot again or an exodus of top players due to money (already many Serie A stars move to England for higher wages). Spain’s La Liga, while historically dominant (especially 2010s), is somewhat vulnerable due to its over-reliance on two superclubs. Real Madrid and Barcelona’s financial struggles (Barça’s debt and forced salary cuts, Real also being cautious in spending) could affect Spain’s standing if those clubs hit a rough patch in Europe. Indeed, in the five-year coefficient, Spain recently fell from 1st to 3rd
as Italian clubs surged. Additionally, La Liga’s new economic regulations on clubs might limit their flexibility in transfers compared to free-spending Premier League clubs, possibly leading to slightly weaker Spanish squads in Europe. That said, Spain’s depth (teams like Atlético, Sevilla, Villarreal often do well in Europe) provides a buffer. Germany’s Bundesliga is very stable as the 3rd or 4th league, but it has a weakness: the gap between Bayern Munich and the rest. If Bayern ever decline (say, through mismanagement or if 50+1 prevents them from matching English clubs’ spending as revenues explode), Germany’s European results might suffer since other German clubs have been inconsistent in UCL deep stages. However, with Bayern a fixture in at least the quarter-finals most years, Germany’s position is secure. Another factor: the Bundesliga’s international TV revenue is far below Premier League and behind La Liga – if global interest keeps skewing to England/Spain, German clubs might have relatively less to spend on top talent, potentially hurting competitiveness. Lastly, England’s Premier League looks nearly untouchable financially, but even it has hypotheticals: a significant drop in broadcast rights value (if, for instance, a major market stopped investing in EPL rights or a global recession hits sports revenues) could slow its growth. Brexit’s impact on player movement and the weaker pound have slightly increased costs for English clubs, but not enough to stem the tide. It would likely take mismanagement on a league-wide scale or a superior breakaway league to challenge the Premier League’s supremacy. One can imagine, for example, if an European Super League had formed and included Premier League’s top clubs, the domestic league’s value might have dropped. Or if state-backed leagues like Saudi significantly expand and start competing with the EPL for global TV audiences (currently a long shot), that could be a threat. Internally, the Premier League’s competitive balance could erode if a couple of clubs (like Man City, Newcastle with state wealth) win every year – if it becomes too predictable, fan interest could wane. But for now, the Premier League’s momentum is only increasing; even historically “small” clubs are now signing world-class players, making it hard to envision a decline.
Potential Fallers Among Smaller Leagues: Just as some leagues aim to rise, others risk falling further behind. We’ve already seen drastic drops – e.g. Russia, which went from a solid top-6 league to outside the top 15 after the UEFA ban
. If the war and ban persist, Russia will remain out in the cold, and its club quality may deteriorate with reduced competition and revenue. Ukraine’s league will likewise tumble in ranking the longer the conflict lasts – Shakhtar Donetsk and Dynamo Kyiv can’t accrue many points when they’re at such a disadvantage. Turkey and Greece, as discussed, have already dropped out of the top 10 and could slip more if they don’t get a handle on finances; countries like Switzerland or Serbia are not far behind them now in coefficient points. For instance, Greece did rebound to 11th in the provisional 2024 ranking
, but could drop if its clubs don’t maintain recent improvements. Smaller leagues are volatile – a golden generation can vault a league up (as Scotland experienced when Rangers made a Europa League final, pushing Scotland to 8th at one point), but once those points age out, the ranking falls if not sustained. Scotland has indeed slipped back to 14th
after Celtic and Rangers had a poor 2022/23 in Europe. Belgium and Netherlands face pressure to keep their recent high performances – if Ajax, PSV or Club Brugge have a couple of off years, Portugal could overtake them again. And at the lower end, many leagues in Eastern Europe (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria) that once produced European champions in the 80s have fallen outside the top 20 entirely, mainly due to player exodus and poor management – they could fall further into obscurity unless serious reforms occur domestically.
In conclusion, the hierarchy of European leagues is not set in stone, but change comes gradually. The Big Four have created a self-reinforcing ecosystem of wealth and talent that others can only chip away at over time with prudent strategies. France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium show the most promise of closing the gap, especially if they capitalize on opportunities like favorable UEFA access lists or collaborative ventures. Watching metrics like UEFA coefficient trends, financial reports (e.g. revenue growth rates), and transfer balance sheets can indicate who is gaining ground. At the same time, vigilance is needed even at the top – history shows leagues can decline through complacency or crisis. Each “tier” of league must adapt continuously: the top dogs to retain their edge without imploding financially, and the chasing pack to innovate and maximize their strengths. European football’s landscape in a decade could see a Big Five or Big Six, or conversely an even tighter elite circle – much will depend on decisions made in boardrooms and institutions today, far beyond just the results on the pitch.